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DICKINSON MAW REVIEW

RECENT CASES
PRACTICE--JOINDER OF ADDITIONAL DEFENDANTS-SERVICE
OF PROCESS - VENUE: Should a party institute an action by his attorney, he
has thereby submitted himself to the jurisdiction of that court for any other
action. The basis for such jurisdiction is the appearance of the party through his
attorney. This is the holding of the recent case of Vaughan v. Womeldorf.1
Aside from the unique holding of this case, its facts interpose an interesting question which apparently was overlooked, to wit, is not a severance
necessary in order to join an original party as an additional defendant? A discussion of both points of law will flow from a recital of the facts.
The appellant, Donald W. Kelly, was involved in an automobile accident
in Elk County. He was driving an automobile in which, as passengers, were his wife,
Florence, his daughter, Cassandra, Iva Gantz and Avanell Vaughan. All were
residents of Warren County. The automobile collided with a tractor trailer
operated by Edward Swanson and owned by Darl D. Womeldorf, the appellee,
residents of Allegheny County.
Three suits were insituted against Womeldorf in Allegheny County. Two of
the suits were by the women passengers in Kelly's car, Iva Gantz, and Avanell
Vaughan, and their husbands. The third suit was by Kelly, his wife, and by Kelly,
as guardian for his daughter.
The reason for the appeal came when the original defendant, Womeldorf,
attempted to join Kelly by service upon the attorney (since Kelly was not present
in the county) as an additional defendant in all three actions. Kelly resisted this
maneuver by means of a preliminary objection as to the jurisdiction of the
person. The preliminary objection was overruled by the lower court. An appeal
followed in which the Supreme Court held that "it would be unrealistic to decide
that the additional defendant [Kelly] in in esse within Allegheny County to
institute suit, but not in esse to be served while in that county (being represented
therein by his attorney of record)."
Before elucidating on this holding, it might be helpful to point out that
the original defendant is in a dilemma. The dilemma is a result of Pa. R. C. P.
2254(a), which states "a defendant or additional defendant shall have the
same right of service as though he were a plaintiff." The plaintiff's service
of process rights in this trespass action are either to commence the action in the
cause of action county and employ deputized service to obtain jurisdiction over
the defendant or to bring the action where the defendant can be personally
served.2 In the Vaughan case there were three separate actions brought by three
separate plaintiffs in a county other than the one where the accident occurred.
1 366 Pa. 262 (1951).
2 SPLR. C. P. 1042.
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Now, since Womeldorf was the defendant in all three actions, his rights of
service in each case should be regarded as though he were a plaintiff, and a
plaintiff bringing an action in a county other than the county where the accident
occurred does not have the right of deputized service. Therefore, since the
plaintiff had chosen to bring the action in a county other than the cause of
action county, the defendant, Womeldorf, was restricted to serving the additional
defendant in the county in which he could be served, i.e., without the use of
deputized service. 3 Since Kelly, the prospective additional defendant, lived
in a county other than the county in which the action was subsisting, the problem
presented itself as to how the original defendant could get jurisdiction of Kelly.
If the defendant obtained jurisdiction of Kelly while Kelly was in the county
in which the action was subsisting, there would be no problem. But as is usually
the case, and as it was in the Vaughan case, the prospective additional defendant
will remain away from the county in which the action is subsisting. In such
a situation the defendant's only remedy is to petition the court where jurisdiction
is obtained over the additional defendant for a transfer and to petition the court
where the original action is subsisting to accept transfer of action. This is
both costly and troublesome.
The remedy available to a defendant in this dilemma, as above pointed out,
was not followed in the Vaughan case. The method of service of process in the
Vaughan case was to serve Kelly's attorney. The validity of the service upon
Kelly's attorney certainly would not be doubtcd if the process concerned the action
in which Kelly was a party, but service of process on Kelly's attorney for causes
of action in which Kelly was not a party is certainly a departure from existing
4
law.
The basis for jurisdiction in this case was the presence ot Kelly's attorney
in Allegheny County. The court said, "the plaintiff Kelly was already within
Allegheny County in connection with this accident and was represented by his
attorney who was duly served." Again, there would be no doubt that jurisdiction
was established as to the action in which Kelly was a party, but the original
defendant, Womeldorf, joined Kelly as an additional defendant in a cause of action to which Kelly was not a party.
In order to point out the problem more vividly let us imagine that Kelly
was not within the state of Pennsylvania and had in no other way submitted
himself to the jurisdiction of the state. In such a case it could easily be said, using
the Vaughan case as a precedent, that the empowering of an attomy for one
specific object thereby subjects the client to the jurisdiction of the state's
courts for other purposes.
Fortunately, there is some hedging in the opinion which may drastically
qualify the jurisdiction question. The opinion dwells on the fact that Kelly was
being joined to all pending actions against the defendant "growing out of the
s KoU et al. v. Pidcford, 353 Pa. 118, 44 A.2d 276 (1945).
4 2 R. C. L 322, 525.
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same accident." This may qualify the holding, but certainly the breach of a
long standing jurisdictional proposition has been made. It is hoped that the holding
of the Vaughan case is restricted to its facts.
This case aptly points out the ridiculous situation in which a defendant may
find himself should he attempt to join a person as an additional defendant if
the action is brought in a county other than the cause of action county, and the
prospective additional defendant is not present in the county in which the original
action was instituted. As previously mentioned, the only remedy of the defendant is to serve the prospective additional defendant where he can be found
and then to petition the court of that county to transfer the case to the county
where the original action was commenced. It is readily seen that much difficulty and
delay will be occasioned by such a procedure. Would it not be better to adopt
a rule whereby the original defendant could bring in an additional defendant
no matter where he could be found, using deputized service if necessary?
This was the inendment of the "Sci Fa Act" of May 18, 1933 P.L. 807, which
was repealed by Pa. R. C. P. 2775. This gives the original defendant more rights
as to service of process than possessed by the plaintiff because the plaintiff
could not take advantage of deputized service if the action were commenced
in a county other than the cause of action county. But since the plaintiff chooses
the county in which the action is commenced, how can he complain of prejudice?
Regardless, such a rule would obviate the ridiculous situation above pointed out,
and this is reason enough for any rule.
The Vaughan case also allowed the joinder of an original party to the action
as an additional defendant. This is a clear violation of Pa. R. C. P. 2252 (a) which
states, "In any action the defendant or any additional defendant may file as of
course a praecipe for a writ to join as an additional defendant any person not a
party to the action . . ."6 The facts of the Vaughan case show that Kelly joined
as a party plaintiff with his wife for recovery of medical expenses and for loss
of consortium. In order for Kelly to have been joined as an additional defendant,
a severance should have been necessary. However, a later consolidation would also
be necessary because of Pa. R. C. P. 2228(a) which requires the husband to
join the wife in bringing suit for loss of consortium and medical expenses on
pain of being barred from bringing suit at a later date. The net result is that
the husband is a party plaintiff and also an additional defendant.
In the Vaughan case the result was the same even though the original defendant did not comply with the Rules of Civil Procedure. Since there is no
prejudice occasioned in such a situation, would it not be wise to make an exception of Pa. R. C. P. 2252(a) allowing a husband to be joined as an additional
defendant without first severing the action? This exception would be restricted
to the situation above described, and its use would be within the discretion of
the court.
Walter A. Dart, Jr.
SItcs

moupal
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ATTRACTIVE NUISANCE CONCEPT - ELEMENT OF ALLUREMENT
CHILD DROWNING. - DUTY OF LANDOWNER
In Newsby v. West Palm Beach Water Co.,' an action for alleged negligent
death of the plaintiff's minor child, it appeared that the defendant owned, operated, and controlled a plant for treating, storing, and distributing water to the
city of West Palm Beach. One feature of this plant was a reservoir 120' long, 50'
wide and 14' deep. It was within the corporate limits of the city, not fenced, and
was on the land of the defendant. It was surrounded by grass lawns and as one
approached it the land rose about seven feet above the general ground level
to a reservoir surrounded by a curb 8" high and 10" wide. On the inside it
slanted gradually to the bottom. A part of the equipment of the reservoir was a
series of pipes which sprayed water into thc air reflecting light rays in rainbow
colors. The reservoir was about 75' from the highway adjacent to a thickly populated area of the city of West Palm Beach.
A child of the plaintiff, 8 years and 10 months of age, approached the
reservoir on August 3, 1947 and while playing near it fell in and was drowned.
A demurrer to the declaration was sustained, final judgment was entered for the
defendant, and the plaintiff appealed. The lower court followed the rule as previously announced in Florida2 in sustainin'g the demurrer.
"Owners of artificial lakes, fish ponds, mill ponds, and gin ponds,
or other pools, streams, or bodies of water are not guilty of actionable
negligence on account of drowning unless
(1) they are constructed so as to constitute a trap or
(2) there is some unusual element of danger lurking about them
not existent in ponds generally."
The appellate court affirmed this rule and denied recovery declaring as a
matter of law that the defendant was not guilty of actionable negligence because
(1) The water spray with the rainbow affect, which apparently was the
alluring object, was not the proximate cause of the child's death.
(2) It was not shown that the reservoir was so constructed as to constitute
5
a trap or an unusual element of danger, referring to the fact that in the Allen case
sand banks not only attracted the child to the water but were the proximate cause
of the drowning.
This case illustrates a requisite of a doctrine accepted by about two-thirds
of the American Courts, and which these courts have mislabeled the Attractive
Nuisance Doctrine.4 That requisite is the landowner's duty to trespassing children,
and the question is, "What is the test for determining a landowner's duty to
trespassing children?"
47 So. 2d 527 (1950).
I -Fla.-,
2 Allen v. William P. McDonald Corp., -Fla.-

8 See note 2, supra.
4 Paomsa oN ToRTs. (1941) p. 6t.

, 42 So. 2d 706 (1949).
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Justification for the Attractive Nuisance Doctrine is found in most cases
in the adoption of bare fictions 5 such as:
(1) the child, because of his age, is not considered a trespasser; or
(2) he has an implied license or invitation to enter; or
(3) the defendant has set a trap for him and inflicted wanton or reckless
injury upon him; or
(4) the child has been allured or enticed upon the premises "as bait attracts a fish, or as a piece of stinking meat attracts a dog." 6
It is upon this last basis that this case 7 was apparently decided, and the
holding in it makes it permissible to conclude that four factors must exist before
the landowner's duty will arise to a trespassing child to protect him from unreasonable risks of harm:
(1) The child must be induced to trespass by the artificial condition.
(2) He cannot have discovered it after he came upon the land.
(3) The artificial condition must contain an unusual element of danger
or must constitute a trap.
(4) It must be the dangerous propensity of this artificial condition which
has attracted the child that causes injury to him.
It is only when these factors exist that there will be a duty on the part
of the defendant to protect the child, and if any one of them is lacking recovery
will be denied.
This rule, together with its requirements, can be traced to a decision by
Justice Holmes 8 where an artificial pond on the land of the defendant which
was polluted with a dangerous chemical caused the death of two boys. The first
two factors above were not present, nor was the last, but the third factor existed.
Recovery was denied. Justice Holmes stating,
"In the case at bar it is at least doubtful whether the water could be seen
from any place where the childrtn lawfully were, and there is no
evidence that it was that water which lead them on the land but that
is necessary to start the duty. There can be no general duty on the part
of the landowner to keep his land safe for children, or even free from
hidden dangers if he has not directly or by implication invited or
licensed them to come here . . ." (Italics Mine)
Rather than.a rule with exceptions to it, it may be said here that the exceptions are very clear cases, and no one would deny that the defendant has a
duty even, to trespassers insofar as setting traps is concerned. The exceptions to
5 Ibid.

6 1 ToMP$ON

ON NEGLIGENCE 505 (lSt ed. 1886).
7 See note 1.
8 United Zinc & Chemical Co. v. Britt, 258 U.S. 268, 42 S. Ct. 299, 66.L.Ed. 615, 36 A. L

PL
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the rule in this case then are actually two well settled rules of law, qualified by
the fact that the child must be attracted by and injured by the artificial condition.
The Britt Case was quoted with approval in the case Allen v. Williams1 O
as being the weight of authority, and since the Newsby case" follows the
Allen case it consequently adopts the Brit Rule.

The Restatement of Torts 12 states:
"It is not necessary that defendants should know that the condition
which he maintains upon his land is likely to attract children, or that the
children's trespasses shall be due to the existence of the condition. It
is sufficient ...

that the possessor knows or should know that children

are likely to trespass upon a part of the land upon which he maintains
a condition which is likely to be dangerous to them because of their
childish propensities to intermeddle or otherwise." (Italics Mine)
Under the Restatement then:

(1) The child's trespass need not be induced by the artificial condition;
(2) The child may have discovered it after he comes upon the land.
It goes on, 18 "an artificial condition may be peculiarly dangerous to
children because of their tendency to intermeddle with things which are
notoriously attractive to them ...Children are notoriously inattentive of

their surroundings and this characteristic may make it unlikely that
children would discover a condition which would be obvious to an adult.
The lack of experience and judgment normal to young children may prevent them from realizing that a condition as observed by them is dangerOus."

Therefore, (3) The object which attracts them need not contain an unusual
element of danger or constitute a trap. It follows that the fourth factor need not
be present either, i.e.
(4) It need not be the dangerous propensity of the object which has attracted the child that causes the injury to him.
Therefore, the Restatement does not follow the rule as laid down in the
Britt Case1 4 by Justice Holmes, and this view, although followed for awhile by
the Pennsylvania Courts, 5 has been repudiated by them,1 6 and by the majority
of American jurisdictions.' 7 These no longer hold that the object which lured the
child to the premises must be the object which caused the injury.
10 See note 2.
11 See note 1.

12 Restatement, Torts § 339 comment (a), Illus. 2.
IsRestatement, Torts § 339 comment (b).
14
15
16
54

See note 8.
Rapcynski v. W. T. Cowan, Inc., 138 Pa. Super. 392, 10 A.2d 810 (1939).
Bartleson et. al. v. Glenn Alden Coal Co. et. al., 361 Pa. 519, 64 A.2d 846 (1949); see also
Dic. L. REv. 102.
17 PROSSER ox Toxis (1941) p. 619.
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The Britt Case15 restricts the scope of the landowner's duty by discarding
forseeability as a criterion and emphasizing instead the exclusive nature of
property rights.
The rule has been at least broadened by federal decision since the Britt Case.19
In a later case 2 0 the plaintiff's child, while on the defendant's wharf, a place
which was frequented by children, fell through a hole and was drowned. In an
action for negligence a verdict was directed for the defendant. It was reversed. The
court held that visits of children may be anticipated, and that particular circumstances give rise to a duty for their protection. It was thought at the time that
this case was the beginning of an interment of the Britt Case 2 ' because the

language of the court indicated a tendency toward a broader rule. In a still later
case2 2 a boy of 8 years sued for injuries received in the defendant's junk yard.
The defendant contended that the boys were not attracted in the sense of the rule
by the car which injured them. The court reversed a judgment for the defendant
saying
.. .the Best Case"8 shows that the visible attraction need not be the

immediate cause of the injury. There the attraction was sand piles; the
cause of the injury was a hole in the wharf. It was not suggested that the
holes were visible from the street
or that they had anything to do with
the child's going on the wharf." 24
The court apparently means that the child need not be attracted by the object
which injures him, but that he may be, for it goes on to say,
"Even if a substantial identity between visible attraction and source of
injury were required, appellant's evidence did not meet the requirement."
So the Supreme Court broadens the rule laid down by Holmes stating in
effect that if the child is attracted at all, he need not be injured by the particular
thing that attracts him. This is certainly not in line with the case we are considering here2 6 where the court states "the water spray was not the proximate cause
of the plaintiff's child falling into the water" as a reason for denying recovery.
The case can possibly be justified on the theory that the child should
have appreciated the risk involved, 26 but that should have been a question of fact
for the jury. It is not the purpose of this note to compare the court's decision to the
Restatement's statement of the Attractive Nuisance concept 27 in every respect, but to
18 See note 8.
19 Ibid.
20 Best v.

District of Columbia, 291 U.S. 411, 54 S. Ct. 47, 78 L.Ed. 882, noted in 34 CoL. L. liv.
"82.
21 34 COL. L. REv. 782.
22 Eastburn v. Levin, App. D. C., 113 F.2d 176 (1940).
28 See note 20.
24 See note 22.

25 See note 1.

26 Restatement, Torts § 339.
27 See notes 12, 13, and 26, supra.
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point out the seemingly inequitable rule favoring the landowner's interests and
comparing that rule to the middle ground taken by the Restatement in determining
whether the defendant should have a duty to protect the trespassing child.
It is submitted, however, as pointed out in the dissent, 28 that erecting a fence
around a reservoir 120' long, 50' wide, and 14' deep near a thickly populated
area where children were likely to come is not much of an expense compared
to the life of a child whose natural curiousity as a matter of common knowledge
may well lead it to the brink of this reservoir ending as in this case in death when
that trespass and that possible curiousity might reasonably have been foreseen.
The rule for determining a duty as suggested by this case is too stringent
a rule for a number of reasons:
(1) A child because of his tender years is incapable of understanding and
appreciating all the possible dangers which he may encounter in trespassing.
(2) Parents natually have a responsibility to safeguard their children, but
they cannot as a practical measure perpetually observe them.
(3) The landowner's interest in unrestricted freedom to make use of his
land should give way in some cases to the greater social interest in protecting the
child.
(4) The rule adopted in this case depends upon a fortuitous circumstance, that
of the child being injured by the olject which attracts him, and is unduly favorable
to the protection of the landowner's exclusive property rights.
(5) The Attractive Nuisance Doctrine should have a criterion for de-

termining whether the landowner has a duty to a trespassing child, and if that
criterion is not foreseeability, but rather a fortuitous circumstance, the duty as
a matter of law depends upon a fortuitous circumstance.
(6) Too many times inflexible and absurd consequences follow from determining negligence as a matter of law. 2 9 With the test adopted by this court all
children subsequently injured under the same circumstances in the same place
even though the defendant knows that children may trespass, and that one has,
in fact, been drowned, would also be denied recovery. The defendant's
duty only extends to the case where the child is attracted by, and injured by,
the rainbow spray. Also the defendant's reservoir has already been declared as a
matter of law free from "unusual elements of danger or as constituting a trap."
(7) Any danger to a child arises out of the fact that a child is likely to
trespass, not out of the fact that he is allured or enticed by the object. Allurement
is only important in determining whether a trespass is likely.80
28 See note 1, supra.

29 Hulings v. Pittsburgh, 150 Pa. Super. 338, 28 A.2d 140 (1942); 54 DICK L REv. 222; 43
HARv. L. Rav. 926.
20

Eldredge, Modern Tort Problems 163, 191 (1941).
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(8) The true basis of liability should
munity as compared to the interest which
to be equitable. You cannot favor the child
can you favor the landowner at the expense

be the value of childlife to the comthe defendant is seeking to protect
at the expense of the landowner nor
of the child.

(9) Any rule concerning a duty of a landowner should not be limited as
here simply because the attraction is in the form of a pond or lake.
Conclusions
(1) Before any liability can be predicated on the part of the landowner there
must be a duty on the part of the landowner to protect this particular individual
from unreasonable risks of harm. Ordinarily the landowner owes no such duty
to a trespasser.
(2) Children, because of their immaturity and lack of judgment, are incapable
of understanding and appreciating all the risks they may encounter in trespassing.
(3) The rule of non-liability to trespassers should not apply to children in
all cases.
(4) There is a split of authority on when this duty is owed.
(5) The Restatement favors the view that a duty is owed if a trespass is
forseeable.
(6) This case and the Britt Case follow the rule that the child must be attracted by the artificial condition which injured him.
(7) The rule in the Britt Case has been accepted in a few jurisdictions but
has been broadened by later Supreme Court decisions and refuted by the Restatement of Torts.
(8) It is submitted that the Restatement and later Supreme Court cases are
more in line with general principles of liability predicated upon land ownership
because the exclusive nature of property rights should give way in some cases to the
greater social interest in protecting the child.
(9) Forseeability of a trespass and not allurement should be the criterion
for determining the landowner's duty for the reasons pointed out.
(10) The element of allurement should only be important in considering
whether a trespass is likely.
William F. Higie

